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FOREWORD
In April 1994, the Army War College and the Strategic Studies
Institute hosted the Fifth Annual Strategy Conference. The theme of this
year's conference was "The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA):
Defining an Army for the 21st Century." Jeffrey R. Cooper presented the
following paper as part of an opening panel which sought to define the
RMA.
Mr. Cooper urges defense planners to determine what strategic--as
opposed to operational--benefits might be derived from the RMA. He
contends that making the internal reforms that will be required will be
as challenging as coming to terms with the operational and strategic
implications of the new technologies.
The first requirement is to understand the parameters and dynamics
of this particular revolution in military affairs. Mr. Cooper puts the
RMA in historical perspective by discussing the relationships among
technology, socioeconomic, and political change, and their implications
for warfare during the Napoleonic era, the mid-19th century, and World
Wars I and II. He argues that, in the past, dramatic technological
change affected warfare in different ways.
Mr. Cooper warns that by using the RMA to define a "technical
legacy" we make three errors. First, such an approach could lead to a
fruitless search for a "silver bullet" technology on which to build the
RMA. Second, the focus on technology could shift attention away from the
critical issues of purpose, strategy, doctrine, operational innovation,
and organizational adaptation. Finally, committing the first two errors
will compound the problem by wasting very scarce defense resources on
new programs and projects which may have little or nothing to do with
the strategic situation.
Military professionals and defense planners alike need to remind
themselves that while technology can provide new capabilities, the
strategic equation is not necessarily driven by technological
innovation.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Along with increased interest in the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) have come pressures to move out quickly with a Department
of Defense (DoD) initiative despite different, if not divergent, views
concerning the character and implications of an RMA on the part of many
decision makers and analysts. In this observer's view, too much
attention has been paid to identifying the key technologies for the RMA
and too much time is still wasted on RMAs as technologically-driven
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phenomena, perhaps because of the original MTR terminology.
Furthermore, far more emphasis than warranted has been placed on using
the RMA to defeat another heavily mechanized regional hegemon like Iraq
(and doing it better), rather than on preparing to address new
challenges, including potential emerging major competitors.
These polestars for attention seem to represent a misunderstanding
of the nature and phenomenology of RMAs as well as a fundamental
misreading of the lessons from earlier RMAs on implementation and
exploitation. RMAs are not merely more clever or even more elegant
technological breakthroughs than are evolutionary military innovations;
these revolutions are more profound in both their sources and
implications. Moreover, while all revolutions are marked by
discontinuous change, this RMA, fueled by the "Information Revolution,"
may have potential for more sweeping and fundamental changes than most
of its historical cousins. The truly revolutionary implications of these
deep changes must be recognized by decision makers in determining the
content and course of an initiative to exploit the RMA.
Therefore, using an RMA initiative, intentionally or
unintentionally, primarily to define a "technical legacy" makes three
crucial errors:
• It misdirects effort toward a probably fruitless search for
"silver bullet" technology on which to build the RMA;
• It misdirects attention away from the critical issues of, and
relationships among purpose, strategy, doctrine, operational innovation,
and organizational adaptation that are the essential issues for an RMA;
• In committing the first two errors, it compounds the problem by
being astrategic since it risks wasting very scarce defense resources on
new programs that may be irrelevant to future security challenges.
This course would be particularly unfortunate since it would
squander the rare opportunity presented by the changes in technological
conditions to enable an RMA that could appropriately forge America's
military for the evolving geostrategic environment, one that is also
being reshaped by fundamental changes in the underlying political,
economic, and socio-cultural conditions.
For DoD to successfully pursue an initiative to exploit the RMA,
fundamental questions concerning the process of an RMA, the strategic
objectives for this initiative, the specific technical and operational
content to be pursued, its potential military utility on the
battlefield, and the means for its implementation will all need to be
answered. Moreover, before decision makers can properly proceed, they
will also need to know:
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• What strategic benefits can be expected from the RMA;
• How they can use this initiative to reform DoD internally in
order to address future challenges;
• What are the potential organizational and structural
implications and consequences (not the least of which are the
bureaucratic and budgetary impacts).
This monograph proposes some hypotheses for a number of these key
issues concerning the RMA. It tries to illuminate key issues from the
decision maker's perspective, focusing first on the potential role of an
RMA in U.S. national security planning. By addressing these issues
explicitly, we can clarify this critical set of questions: the strategic
purpose and utility of an RMA and what is expected from the RMA
initiative. Having addressed teleology, we can then turn to the second
set of issues, defining the appropriate character of our implementation
of the RMA and the content of its component elements to meet the
spectrum of relevant military objectives at the operational and tactical
levels. With the purpose and content of the RMA characterized, the third
set of issues concerning the means of effective implementation and
exploitation can be addressed. Finally, some of the more significant
implications of these potential changes will be highlighted.
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ANOTHER VIEW OF THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
Introduction.
Since the subject was raised within the American defense
community,2 the Revolution in Military Affairs has been the subject of
at least three summer studies, many conferences, numerous papers and
briefings, and a host of war-gaming exercises. As a result of these
efforts, DoD is now investigating an RMA initiative. But while the
community seems to agree on a number of important issues, concord on
other critical points is lacking.

First, almost all participants in the debate now accept that RMAs
are more than just new military technologies or systems and involve
complex operational and organizational issues; but few agree on the
priority among these four elements and identity ofthe key driver (if
only one exists). Second, while there is agreement that this RMA is but
the latest in a historical series of RMAs, little attention has been
paid to the broad strategic implications that placing this RMA in its
long-term historical context suggests for future changes in the conduct
of warfare. Third, while the community largely agrees that there is an
RMA to be pursued, whether it is already in progress, is about to start,
or is mature and about to end all have adherents.Fourth, more
problematically, there is no agreement concerning the character of this
RMA--i.e., a specific definition of this RMA, not merely identification
of constituent technical elements; and, therefore, there is no
substantive roadmap for proceeding. Indeed, reviewing the current
literature and debates, it appears that there may be several different
RMAs that are being discussed (not unlike the parable of the blind men
and the elephant). Fifth, agreement does exist that a focus on careful
implementation will be needed since RMAs are, by nature of the potential
operational and organizational changes, antithetical to existing
cultural norms and bureaucratic structures. However, few agree on an
overall approach to implementation, much less on the initiative's
critical next steps needed for successful exploitation of the RMA--i.e.,
on the procedural roadmap.
Unfortunately, even less agreement exists on two other important,
higher-level questions; and these questions carry divergent implications
for those issues on which seeming agreement is in hand. The first of
these concerns the relevance of the RMA to the evolving U.S. national
security problem, and as specific aspects of this question:
• The relevance of the RMA to a broad spectrum of conflict types
and intensities that the United States may face;
• The military benefits, at both the operational and tactical
levels, across this spectrum of conflict;
• An assessment of whether the RMA is the most appropriate
instrument for addressing these evolving problems;
• The strategic implications and consequences (both intended and
unintended) of pursuing this initiative; and finally,
• A determination as to whether this RMA is in our long-term
national interest.
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The second question concerns the role and utility of the RMA as a
potential organizing principle for future defense policy, programs and
bureaucratic relationships. In particular, what are potential
implications of the RMA, with its probable stress on greater force
integration and joint command of operations, for future roles and
missions of the Services, and what are the divergent implications for
each of the Services?
By clearly identifying the key issues for resolution, it is hoped
that DoD can (1) define the strategic purpose of the RMA initiative; (2)
refine what is expected from the RMA in terms of strategic, operational,
and tactical objectives; and (3) assess what is the most appropriate
content of this RMA to meet this spectrum of military need. Only with
the purpose and content of the RMA accurately characterized can
understanding the phenomenology of previous RMAs then assist in
determining the most effective means for implementation and exploitation
of this revolution. Thus, the two most critical questions that must be
answered before agreement can be reached to pursue an RMA (and the
concomitant issue of how best to do so) are the purpose and the nature
of the RMA to be pursued--what are the character and the core elements
of this revolution. This monograph is not intended to provide definitive
answers to these important questions, a treatment worthy of volumes; but
it does propose hypotheses for these important RMA-related issues that
can serve to frame the debate for decision makers.
Choices for the Decision Maker.
The RMA is a complex subject, and there are multiple ways that
decision makers may choose both to view the RMA and to pursue an RMA
initiative, all with potentially divergent implications. Explicit
identification and proper assessment of the options for proceeding
appear essential for real progress. Defining the objectives for an RMA
initiative involves two related but really distinct sets of issues: one
related to how the RMA is perceived by decision makers, and the second
related to what the RMA really is. This section will discuss the choices
that arise from the multiple ways top-level decision makers may perceive
the RMA; the question of what the RMA is will be discussed later. From
the decision makers' standpoint, these different perspectives on the RMA
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include: a teleological focus that can be either external or internal;
focus on specific challenges or types of threats versus focus on the RMA
as a process to adapt to broader and continuing environmental changes;
employing the RMA as an instrument for organizational development versus
using the RMA as a filter for new technologies; and, finally, the choice
of whether to pursue an RMA versus what RMA to pursue.
Depending on their perspective of external or internal objectives
for the RMA, decision makers can be separated into two broad groups
(that are not, however, necessarily mutually exclusive). The external
perspective focuses on the potential role of the RMA as a means of
attaining strategic objectives in the evolving geostrategic environment,
one in which the United States is likely to face a new set of security
challenges. The internal perspective, on the other hand, sees the
potential utility of the RMA as an organizing principle for DoD that can
assist in determining future policy, programs, and bureaucratic
relationships--in essence, as a tool to shape the department, if not the
larger community, to the evolving strategic realities, including
long-term fiscal pressures and reduced priority accorded to national
security by decision makers and the American public. But while both are

2

valid, how the RMA is used to achieve internally-directed objectives
appears to depend critically on the choices the decision makers take
with respect to the external objectives for the RMA. To assure strategic
relevance, moreover, the RMA must address the basic national security
challenges at hand--how best to deal with the diverse types of
competitors that may emerge over the longer term. These challenges may
include old problems posed by new competitors, new problems posed by old
competitors, and new problems from emerging competitors (that we may not
4
yet be able to even articulate, much less specifically characterize).
The second perspective, focused on the internal objectives,
involves how the DoD leadership intends to use the RMA initiative to
shape the future direction of the department once it understands the
external purposes for the initiative. These internal choices include
whether the RMA can provide a conceptual basis for future strategy; for
prioritizing R&D efforts and acquisition programs; a legitimization of
change as a way of life (i.e., a way to institutionalize a "permanent
revolution"); a rationale for altering roles and missions; a framework
for reorganizing bureaucratic structures; or merely an additional filter
(as with strategic competitiveness) in the policy process. Indeed, much
of the interest in the RMA seems to stem from the potential role an RMA
could serve as an organizing principle (or rationale) for the wealth of
technology opportunities now appearing, even amid the poverty of
budgetary resources for defense needs. Overall, is the RMA as process a
generally applicable tool or suited only to specific issues? For many of
these purposes, the idea of an RMA may be just as important as detailed
content since its primary use is as a motivating instrument. Pursuit of
an RMA initiative will have significant implications for doctrinal
development, operational requirements, force posture, and R&D strategy;
and these will create opportunities for major institutional and
bureaucratic changes.
The ability of an RMA to address potential disparate security
challenges turns on whether it is an idiosyncratic event or a process.
If the RMA is a specific event that synthesizes particular technologies,
military systems, operational innovations, and organizational
adaptations to address effectively existing challenges, can it also meet
emerging problems? Given the apparent agreement that there is an RMA and
that this RMA is but one in a historical series, there are two potential
answers to this issue. One, that an RMA is a specific solution to a
particular strategic problem, in which case it may not be relevant to
emerging challenges. Or two, that RMAs are organic to the broad
geostrategic milieu, arising from the general nature of the stage of
socioeconomic development and technologies, in which case this RMA will
retain its relevance as long as new challenges will also arise from that
same general milieu.
If, on the other hand, the RMA is a process for synthesizing
strategically appropriate responses, then it can play a longer-term role
even if the strategic environment changes dramatically, presenting
fundamentally new types of military problems. In this latter case,
however, the important question must focus on the broad character of
RMAs--not on the mission-specific tasks nor the collection of advanced
technologies and military systems supporting them in a particular RMA-since these elements can only usefully be defined as the future
circumstances unfold. Analysis of these issues can provide the answers
to whether an RMA initiative (or a strategy based on the RMA) can serve
as an overall approach to potential competitors; whether an RMA will be
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consistent with long-term U.S. security interests; and whether an RMA
will offer benefits in nontraditional missions such as drug interdiction
and peacekeeping.
A final but related analytical issue concerns choice; not only
what objectives decision makers may select, but whether or not there is
a choice in pursuing the RMA. Should we pursue the RMA for its own sake?
Because it can be done? Because it promises substantial advantages in
addressing our evolving security challenges? Or finally, because we may
have no choice since potential competitors may decide to pursue the RMA
regardless of our course? The obverse point is equally important, are we
currently good enough to answer potential challenges without the RMA;
and if so, why should we disturb this present situation? In this regard,
the example of the impact of the Dreadnought on the naval balance and
subsequent competition before World War I may provide a cautionary note
to proceeding before we understand both the purpose and implications of
the RMA. By essentially starting the competition from scratch,
Dreadnought obviated the utility of the large British investment in
previous battleship and heavy cruiser fleets.
Issues of Strategic Purpose.
In order to address the issue of purpose, it is essential to
understand the range of potential situations in which the RMA might need
to be relevant. These issues, therefore, must be addressed in the
context of what wars may be fought and how they will be fought, not only
the more usual question of who our principal adversary will be. In the
new geostrategic environment, what will U.S. strategic objectives be:
will the United States employ force only in response to specific acts of
aggression or in defense of particular interests, or will it to use its
military power more generally--to shape the strategic environment, to
defend liberty and promulgate values? Will the United States be
strategically defensive or strategically offensive during this period?
Indeed, in this new international structure three questions emerge.
First, who defines the rules of conflict? Second, will the United States
be able to define the nature and level of conflict? And third, what
5
constraints can be applied to the conduct of warfare?
These questions
strike at the heart of whether the United States will have the choice of
selecting the types of conflict in which we engage and at how
competitors may decide to contest our power or determination--and,
therefore, the purpose, role, and utility of an RMA.
The controlling factors may be not only the nature of the evolving
competitions but also the very real constraints of size, budgetary
pressures, and economic linkages reshaping U.S. military posture and the
issue of what impacts these will have on on key competitors. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, it is unlikely in the immediate future
that the United States will face a new challenger of that caliber.
Rather it will have to deal with significantly smaller opponents either
singly or in concert. Moreover, in the wake of both the Soviet collapse
and the Gulf War, it is also especially important to recognize that the
previous U.S. concern for the adverse asymmetry in force size no longer
pertains and that U.S. technical advantages need no longer be considered
to be merely a necessary qualitative offset to the quantitative
advantages possessed by probable opponents. While several nations like
China and India continue to possess large conventional force structures,
it is likely that in future regional conflicts forces in coalition with
the United States will be as large (and almost certainly better equipped
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and trained) as those of any regional adversary. Furthermore, and often
not explicitly recognized, the collapse of the Soviet threat to Western
Europe also implies that regional adversaries (the old "half-war"
contingencies) must now be prepared to face a United States
unconstrained by the need to retain the most formidable parts of U.S.
force structure for the European (the classic "one war") contingency
that previously dominated our thinking. Even while we may plan on a
"two-war" capability, any opponent must be prepared to face the full
weight of whatever U.S. military power exists.
Three other, perhaps more subtle, factors are also at work in
shaping the strategic environment. First, the collapse of the Soviet
Union also removes the only major power capable both of sponsoring
regional opponents at distances from their borders (and threatening the
United States with strategic forces) and of supplying them with the most
advanced conventional weapons and technical assistance on concessionary
terms.6 Second, in a major regional contingency, the United States can
apply a range of nonmilitary strictures (such as embargoes and boycotts)
against the opponent to further constrain his war effort without fear of
opposing superpower intervention to undercut these actions. Coupled with
the clear technological, doctrinal, and tactical superiority that was
demonstrated during the Gulf War, these factors taken in combination
suggest that the United States will possess demonstrable military
dominance over regional contenders for the foreseeable future. Third,
the likelihood that the United States will fight in future conflicts as
part of coalitions not only increases the array of forces an opponent
will confront, but also opens significant new vulnerabilities for the
United States. The implications of coalition warfare, including
political sensitivities, allied casualties, and concern for collateral
damage, will have substantial impacts on how these campaigns are
conducted. Indeed, these "softer" factors may be as important in
planning coalition warfare as the more obvious issues of force
integration, standardization and interoperability, and allocation of
roles and missions.
These factors suggest that very few rational opponents are likely
to wish to challenge (or be capable of challenging) us in a contest with
mass theater-wide, multidimensional forces--given the very credible
demonstration of U.S. capabilities displayed in DESERT STORM. Therefore,
new opponents may decide, if they are determined to challenge us, to
pose different problems, challenges that an RMA narrowly focused on the
DESERT STORM scenario and based on technologies demonstrated in that
conflict may be less capable of addressing successfully. For example,
our next opponent could pose the problem of how to respond quickly
despite his actively contesting our force deployment, while he may
possess nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
long-range delivery systems capable of threatening not only U.S. forces,
but allies, and third countries who control essential transit and
staging facilities. Moreover, even if an opponent holds the same
strategic objectives, he may be able to pursue them through different
strategic concepts. Thus, overt cross-border invasion is not the only
way of seizing neighboring territory; coups, destabilization,
insurgencies, fifth columns, and blackmail are also among the
7
traditional bag of tricks for aggressors.
And in these cases, the
United States could find itself on the operational offensive against
nonmechanized forces already deployed in very difficult tactical
environments.
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Alternatively, an enemy may also decide to pursue a different set
of strategic objectives--damage, disruption to civil society, or
interference with key global links, and use different strategic
concepts--long-range attack, clandestine forces, urban warfare (as
currently in Bosnia and formerly in Beirut), terrorism, or subornation
and blackmail of civilian populations, using modern communications to
bypass the government itself.8 While there may be concern that "we don't
do windows" (jungles, mountains, cities), even in those mission areas
that we do, the next opponent may force us to do things so differently
that we don't accomplish these missions very well either--for example,
by employing large numbers of light forces, using mines densely on the
battlefield, or contesting operations in littoral waters with mines,
small but lethal fast attack boats, or conventional submarines. Current
national strategy and defense planning largely ignore these potential
problems in their narrow focus on heavily-armed, largely mechanized, and
quite technically sophisticated regional hegemons. Before the United
States commits itself to an RMA initiative, it is essential to decide on
which parts of the conflict map to focus our exploitation efforts.

The Evolving Conflict Map. Unless either Mexico or Canada
unexpectedly transforms itself into an aggressive regional threat, by
definition the United States will not in the near-term be the direct
object of aggression by a regional power, such as Iran, Iraq, and North
Korea. Therefore, we will fight conflicts with them at extended
distances, and, with the exception of regional threats that acquire
intercontinental strike systems, without direct threat to our national
survival.9 As we did in the Persian Gulf, we will have to transport and
support our combat forces; however, unlike in that conflict, we may not
have the luxury of six months of force buildup. Our opponent may
actively contest our deployment and force buildup, directly or by
applying pressure on allies and neutrals that control critical transit
and staging facilities. Indeed, it is highly likely that with the lesson
of that war in mind, the next regional aggressor may choose to strike
quickly, before we can bring major forces to bear; and he may choose a
strategic concept that allows him to do so. In addition, he may choose:
forces that create lower signatures during his mobilization and buildup
phases than armored and mechanized divisions; forces that can move to
strike quickly at the target's strategic centers of gravity; or forces
that are more difficult to target as he consolidates his position. Given
the current strategic focus on a narrow set of regional contingencies,
likely to be conducted in unprepared theaters, often without the benefit
of in-place heavy infrastructure, logistics support and predeployed
forces, the real challenge for U.S. military strategy may not be
decisively defeating an opponent once we engage, but projecting power in
a timely and responsive manner. Therefore, a key operational challenge
will be the need to enhance our ability to move to the theater quickly
while improving our capability to wage intense, short-duration combat to
destroy enemy forces. The significant change from pre-deployed forward
forces to a force projection military waging expeditionary campaigns
requires that we alter our entire campaign paradigm, and it should focus
our near-term attention on the problems of designing a force capable of
rapidly deploying real combat power to a contingency theater against
active opposition.
Unfortunately, not all lesser opponents are Iraq, as we had
already discovered in Vietnam. Some opponents may be less susceptible to
damage and pain, against either their military forces or civil societies
10
(as we discovered during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts).
For many
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regional opponents, however, their military forces may be among the most
modern and highest value assets (both in terms of equipment and human
capital) they possess. Like the armies of the Italian city-states, they
may be too valuable to risk in actual combat. Thus, some opponents may
choose strategic concepts and means of execution that are explicitly
limited and stylized, to which the large-scale and intense violence of a
DESERT STORM-type clash may appear to be neither proportional nor
appropriate either to their limited strategic objectives or to their
constrained means of combat. And while the United States may currently
be transfixed on the problem of stopping rapid cross-border acts of
aggression, potential regional opponents may have other objectives that
can be better served by alternative strategic concepts, particularly in
light of their own vulnerabilities to the type of warfare demonstrated
in the war against Iraq.
Furthermore, the canonical set of threats (focused on regional
hegemons) represents a very small portion of the potential conflict map
that may evolve. And on its face, these threats also appear to be those
for which the current operational and organizational posture of the
American military is best suited. Unless we believe that no more serious
and challenging threats will emerge over the next several decades, we do
need to recognize that we will face a major, even if not a "global"
opponent, during this future.11 How or whether a peer competitor emerges
is likely to be related both to the evolution of the role of war in
interstate relations during this period and to the ability of dominant
U.S. military power to deter the emergence of a challenger. However,
potential peer competitors do have choices about how they challenge us.
While they could seek to do so with the tools of this RMA (the parallel
approach), they might attempt to challenge us with mass and older
technologies. In either case, the RMA would appear to be germane to
these potential contests.
However, the very length of time it may take for a new peer
competitor to emerge suggests that the utility of an RMA exploited today
with a very narrow focus may no longer be evident at the time a
challenge does emerge.12 The new competitors could attempt to identify
the next RMA and confront the United States with a whole new set of
operational and technical challenges. And it is not clear that if they
choose foreign ground (a different strategic concept, a different
purpose, a different set of tools), how an RMA narrowly focused on
DESERT STORM will necessarily be relevant. Especially since a peer
competitor will almost certainly be a major economic power and tightly
integrated into the global economy, his inherent degree of societal
vulnerability may lead him to pursue his strategic objectives through
means that are clearly limited,13 using the implicit "rules of the game"
in an attempt to protect himself from U.S. escalation to more violent
forms of conflict.
As one speculative look into the far future, a potential future
challenger to the system might decide not to engage the United States or
other coalition members militarily, but to strike directly against the
diverse network of international linkages that support the increasing
globalization (and therefore homogenization) of commerce, culture, and
politics. This opponent would be interested in destroying not the
military power but the very fabric of the international system and
striking at its core values, especially if these values are
fundamentally hostile to deep cultural, religious, or ideological
principles. Thus, such a challenger might choose to go directly against
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the linkages that bind major trading partners and regions. As an
historical example of this path, it is worth recalling post-Napoleonic
France's challenge to British naval mastery. Having determined after the
costly loss at Trafalgar that British naval supremacy could not
profitably be challenged directly, the French looked at waging a guerre
de course against what they perceived to be the glue of the British
Empire and of British economic superiority--worldwide trade. The obverse
was that trade links of an island nation forced to import food and most
raw materials, and also dependent, in return, on earnings from its
manufactured exports, were perhaps the critical source of vulnerability-as was to be demonstrated during both World Wars. It is interesting to
contemplate what an attack today against commerce, both sea- and
air-borne, might look like (and how effective it might be) if waged with
modern technologies and innovative operational concepts.
While the United States built forces to maintain sea control
against a traditional naval opponent such as the Soviet Union, this
mission area is now seen as very low priority with the turn in attention
to "littoral warfare" and force projection from the sea. But even if the
United States were to maintain the force capabilities and effective
operational concepts in the interim, how relevant would they be for
maintaining sea control against covert forces, perhaps operating large
numbers of diverse types of modern commerce raiders? Similarly, could
the United States protect the critical routes of commerce against an
opponent intent on waging war against international aviation or
telecommunications?
In addition to classic challenges, there may be other types of
threats emerging in this evolving strategic environment. Indeed, these
conflicts seem more probable than larger-scale, more traditional types
of wars. At the other end of the conflict spectrum, there are likely to
be a series of low-intensity, but not necessarily low-technology,
conflicts resulting from the continuing diffusion of power and
disintegration of existing states. These conflicts may involve both
state and nonstate challengers. Moreover, nonstate challengers, like
those in Somalia and Bosnia, may appear with fundamentally different
objectives as well as strategic concepts of execution. Rather than
attacking a neighbor for territorial aggrandizement, nonstate opponents
might be tempted merely to inflict pain, and thereby destabilization, on
opposing societies. If the object is pain, not publicity, we may find it
difficult to identify the proper target for our response. Alternatively,
the opponent may choose to strike from a posture that makes it
impossible to avoid large-scale collateral damage to innocent
14
populations in preemptive or retaliatory strikes.
These types of
challenges may well call for a different focus from an emerging RMA. A
shift in focus for near-term operations to the lower end of the conflict
spectrum, the increasing importance of peacekeeping/ peacemaking
operations, the complications of multinational coalition operations, and
the "CNN effect,"15 are likely to produce pressures for limited U.S.
casualties and requirements for constraining collateral damage as well.
Can the RMA also provide useful capabilities against this more diverse
array of possible challenges? Finding a successful path through the
thicket of conflicting budgetary and policy pressures may be extremely
difficult, but it also has the potential to be a key benefit if the RMA
is properly conceived.

Changes in the Conduct of Warfare. Periodic fundamental changes in
the nature of war and the conduct of warfare appear to date back far
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into history.16 Examples of previous RMAs can help place this RMA in
historical context. While there may be even earlier examples, such as
development of the Macedonian phalanx and Roman legion, modern examples
begin with the Napoleonic RMA (the "nation in arms")--utilizing for the
first time in modern history the vast resources of a newly
industrializing nation to equip and support a mass army. This RMA was
contemporaneous with three other key upheavals: a political revolution
that spawned democracy and the rise of the republican nation-state; a
socioeconomic convulsion stemming from the Agricultural Revolution; and
an economic sea change resulting from the spread of the Industrial
Revolution to France. The result of the Napoleonic RMA was no less vast:
not just the ability to conquer a neighbor, but to seize a continent--or
in more modern terms, the means to wage a theater-wide campaign.
Since the Napoleonic RMA, many observers believe that, prior to
the one now under discussion, there have been four other significant
military revolutions. The first of these (encompassing both the American
Civil and the Franco- Prussian Wars) built on the railroad and the
telegraph to extend, at the strategic level, the reach, mobility,
communications, and logistics support consistent with the new
continental scope of military operations. It also built on the second
stage of the Industrial Revolution (such as "the American system of
manufactures," i.e., interchangeable parts) to introduce more effective
and lethal weapons, including the Minié-ball, breech-loaded artillery,
and the "needle gun." The World War I RMA incorporated mass production
technologies to equip multimillion man armies to increase mechanization
for support logistics, and to employ factory products like the machine
gun and barbed wire. This RMA turned the operationally mobile warfare of
the previous revolution into fixed, positional, and relatively static,
attrition warfare. The art of generalship was lost, replaced by the
capacity of manpower rich states to supply soldiers and the means to
destroy the other side's soldiers.
The third of these post-Napoleonic RMAs was the dual revolution in
the inter-war period based on efficient internal combustion engines,
tactical and strategic aircraft capabilities, and the radio to
reintroduce strategic and operational mobility, maneuver, and
initiative. On the one hand, these factors allowed the Germans to
develop Blitzkrieg, directed at an operational solution to the problem
of waging a rapid campaign to avoid getting bogged down in a two-front
war in Europe, as happened in World War I. On the other hand, this same
technical foundation supported an RMA by the U.S. Navy that combined
carrier aviation, amphibious assault, and long-range submarine
operations (supported by strategic bombing from seized forward island
bases) to bring about the strangulation of our island opponent. U.S.
strategy for the Pacific conflict recognized that the American strategic
problem was to employ our vast industrial resources to bring about the
decisive defeat of Japan on its home territory. Finally, the last of
these four was the nuclear/long-range strike RMA based on atomic weapons
and intercontinental strike capabilities that focused on the ability to
destroy the economic, political, and social fabric of the modern
nation-state, along with the enemy's military.
Few RMAs cause the kind of deep changes that the Napoleonic RMA
did in both the nature of war and the conduct of warfare. That was a
revolution set in train by a combination of fundamental economic,
political, and social forces. It altered the scale of forces by the
employment of the mass army (up to 500,000 by 1812) and, at the same
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time, it shifted the conduct of warfare by changing the scope to
continental operations. But more importantly, changes in the underlying
conditions set in train by the three contemporaneous upheavals made
military forces relatively cheap; and despite the improvements in
firepower enabled by industrialization, modern nation-states were able
to field and support more forces than any opponent could kill--thus
leading to attrition warfare since Clausewitzian- style strategically
decisive victories were rarely obtainable through coups de main.17 This
150-year period marked an era of military expansion with the shift to
mass armies, continental or global scope of operations, and dependence
on attrition warfare due to the difficulty in staging strategically
decisive battles.
This era may now have come to a close. It was ended both by the
nuclear/long-range strike RMA and by the lethally effective conventional
operations that are now emerging from the nascent RMA. This next
long-term cycle derives from not only a new era of expensive military
forces, but also from a period in which the relative cost of killing is
falling rapidly. The combination of rapidly escalating costs of major
military systems, together with the enhanced lethality, will culminate
in smaller, more valuable forces, along with a recovered ability to
effect decisive victories. The result of this combination of factors
fundamentally alters the underlying terms for military forces; and this
has dramatic implications for the future of warfare as well as the scale
and scope of conflicts. This next RMA appears to possess many of the
properties of a Napoleonic RMA. It may mark the closing of that era in
warfare dominated by large military forces and equally large scopes of
military operations. This RMA may usher in a new period of military
contraction and a return to wars fought for limited objectives by
valuable forces too precious to waste in mass, attrition-style warfare.
These cyclic changes in the scale of military forces and
operations appear to have a cousin in similarly cyclical changes at the
strategic/political level. It is essential that strategy at both the
grand and military levels be appropriate to the environmental
circumstances, as much including the socio-cultural and economic
dimensions as the political.18 The same underlying forces--of
nationalism, agricultural revolution, and industrial revolution--that
allowed Napoleon to create his RMA also altered the objectives, and thus
both the nature of war and the conduct of warfare. Napoleon moved modern
warfare from "limited wars" fought by absolute monarchs, usually ended
with contractual agreements of only modest gains and losses, to wars
fought for unlimited ends, such as the destruction of the opposing state
or regime, under the rubric of "unconditional surrender."19 While
subsequent RMAs have further raised the scale, broadened the scope,
increased the intensity, and heightened the tempo of tactical
operations, they have stayed within this fundamental politico-strategic
framework. Thus, to the extent that this century has been dominated by
conflicts not only between nation-states but between ideological
systems, it has been a period of "total war." The circumstance of
ideological conflict implied that "absolute ends" were proper and "total
means" legitimate.20 The Soviet notion of exploiting the vulnerability
of the rear mirrored Douhet's earlier concept for attacking the enemy's
will through strategic bombing. Under these conditions of "total war,"
there was no functional distinction between attacking the enemy's forces
on the battlefield and attacking the enemy's forces by destroying the
industrial base (and by extension, the entire political, economic, and
social base) that supported them--nor was there a difference in

10

legitimacy.
The "Information Revolution" and the change to post-industrial
economies also seemed to presage significant changes not only for the
means of warfare, but also for the objectives of war. Increasing
globalization of commerce, decreasing economic returns to scale,
near-real-time global telecommunications, the rise of centrifugal forces
within the nation-state, among other trends, all raise questions as to
the future objectives of interstate conflict, the appropriate strategies
for pursuing national objectives under these conditions, and the
operational means for conducting war. The old Clausewitzian objectives
for military operations (destroy military forces, capture the territory,
seize the leadership) largely mirror the key factors that underwrote the
sources of strength of the newly industrializing economies. And these
factors, what economists call the classic factor endowments of land,
labor, and capital, also happened to be contemporaneous and coterminous
with the sources of power of the classic 19th century nation-state. With
the increasing integration of the industrial economies and their
financial systems (and, at the same time, the decreasing importance of
most traditional physical resources and raw materials), many of the
classical notions of the objectives for conflict and the means to pursue
them may be in the process of changing. Particularly in the absence of
deeply-seated ideological conflict, one may speculate that rather than
"total war," more limited objectives will be the norm.
Post-industrial (or information-based) economies build on
information or knowledge as the fourth critical factor endowment. This
carries at least three other significant implications for assessing the
future security environment. First, this new factor endowment is not
dependent on unchangeable physical resources nor on large, fixed capital
investments that have long depreciation and pay-back periods. As a
result, economic power built on this foundation can be developed far
more quickly. Second, this source of strength is also far more agile and
adaptable, and can respond with shorter time constants to changes in the
environment; it may well be capable of greater surprises. Third, this
factor is also more mobile and potentially more transferable; and power
growing from it may be subject to greater diffusion.
Implications for the RMA.
To formulate appropriate new strategy and operational concepts
informed by the RMA, we must address the nature of war as it may evolve
under these circumstances. The concept of "limited war"21 arose during
the cold war in order to differentiate regional conflicts to be fought
both for limited aims and with limited means, from the conflict that
involved a central challenge to the existence of the two superpowers,
which ran the risk of attendant escalation. The twilight of the cold war
may have produced with the Gulf War the first "unlimited war" in
Osgood's terms--a regional conflict in which a superpower was
unconcerned by the potential for escalation to central conflict with the
other superpower. In this case, while the objectives (on our side) were
limited, the United States employed almost unlimited means against Iraq
(with the exception of nuclear weapons). This combination of essentially
unlimited means for achieving limited ends, with the acquiescence of the
losing side, may make lessons from that war dangerously idiosyncratic.
It is likely that future conflicts, especially those involving
multinational coalitions, will demand a closer linkage and greater
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proportionality between objectives and means in order both to limit the
probability of escalation by the losing side and to maintain the
political cohesion of multinational arrangements.22 The move away from
an era of total war will limit both means and ends. These limitations
may once again raise the traditional distinction between enemy forces on
the battlefield and the civil/industrial base. Thus, at the strategic
level, whether an RMA that is perceived by a variety of audiences to
bring to bear essentially unlimited military power is appropriate under
an environment dominated by limitations on objectives is not clear.
Another difficult problem that the United States must confront is
one of the complexity of the future conflict map. Multiple potential
future threats make it necessary to maintain a range of capabilities to
address challenges by potential and as yet unidentified peers at the
highest end of the warfare spectrum, while staying prepared for
conflicts with less technically capable opponents. The United States
must also maintain the mid-term capabilities needed to decisively defeat
regional hegemons, including ones that may possess nuclear capabilities.
Even if we accept that this RMA can create the conditions for decisive
victory in a dense, mechanized theater of war, can it produce the same
results in a less dense, non- mechanized, low-intensity, localized
conflict? Furthermore, if these revolutions derive from the integration
and synergy of the four component elements, can "piece parts" be pulled
out and applied effectively on a discrete basis, and still be a
"revolution?" If the RMA cannot be applied as discrete pieces, should we
not define the broader challenges within the focus of this RMA? Whether
we can build off a common base of strategic needs and technical tools to
appropriately tune the RMA in the exploitation phase to address these
dissimilar challenges may, in the new security environment impacted
centrally by fiscal constraints, ultimately define the military utility
of the RMA as well as the strategic benefits for the decision maker.
To frame the issue most starkly, if the current RMA is nascent
(and, based on historical evidence, it will probably take nearly 20
years to completely implement), should it be narrowly focused on a
current problem (defeating mechanized regional hegemons) that may no
longer be relevant when it comes to fruition or should it be broader and
address threats that may evolve in the future? This question is crucial,
especially if these Revolutions are not existential (they define
themselves and only require recognition) but instead are purposeful
creations of human guidance that can be directed towards particular
strategic objectives and operational implementations.
Understanding Military Technical Revolutions.
Sophisticated observers recognize the complexity of an RMA--that
it is more than just clever new technology. They identify four component
elements: operational innovation, organization adaptation, evolving
military systems, as well as emerging technologies.23 Fundamental issues
for decision makers are to understand what constitutes a real revolution
in military affairs, to recognize the implications of an RMA occurring,
and to determine a standard by which will they measure an RMA, either to
discern whether it exists or to know how well it has succeeded.

Types of RMAs. Reviewing previous revolutions in military affairs
suggests that the issue is complex because there may be three distinct
models for these types of fundamental military innovation, thereby
complicating both definition and recognition. The first type of RMA is
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impelled by new, purely military technology, driven by fundamental
scientific or technological inventions or developments. This is the type
of RMA that has tended to dominate most people's understanding and led
to the common perception of RMAs as technology- driven phenomena. It may
also be the least frequent kind of RMA, with perhaps the recurved bow
and the gunpowder revolution the only other examples of this type. This
RMA was well-exemplified by the nuclear/long-range strike revolution
created from the synthesis of nuclear weapons and intercontinental
strike capabilities.
However, these revolutions present choices as to what strategic
purpose and how to apply these new technologies. The choice of how to
apply the clearly revolutionary technological innovation is whether as
evolutionary improvements for executing existing missions or to create
revolutionary change in the conduct of warfare. But historically, most
technical innovations, especially the truly revolutionary ones, have
been initially applied enhancing performance in the service of old
objectives, without altering the fundamental conduct of warfare. For
example, one could well argue that nuclear weapons merely allowed the
fulfillment of Douhet's concepts for strategic air warfare. Spectacular
technical breakthroughs, such as those that offer "order of magnitude"
improvements in effectiveness or efficiency of existing missions, may
well mask the need for more fundamental and far-reaching changes, in the
same way that too many or too cheap resources are a breeding ground for
economic inefficiency.
The second type of RMA, driven by operational and organizational
innovation to redress a strategic problem, is well illustrated by the
German Blitzkrieg developed in the inter-war period. While this type of
RMA may not involve change in basic strategic objectives, it clearly
involves fundamental change in the conduct of warfare, emphasizing not
technological but more usually organizational and operational
innovations. Because this type of RMA tends not to be
resource-intensive, historically it has often been created by the
defeated in the previous conflict. And importantly from today's
perspective, because it is less hostage to long development and costly
acquisition cycles, it may offer the best opportunity to address our
near- and mid-term problems.
The third type, of which the Napoleonic RMA is the classic
example, is driven by fundamental economic, political, and social
changes outside the immediate military domain. These forces enable
deep-seated and fundamental transformation of both the nature and the
conduct of warfare. However, because these changes begin outside the
military domain, they may be the most difficult to recognize and the
most complex to adapt to military purposes.24
Revolutions (whether political, economic, socio-cultural,
scientific, or military), by definition, imply discontinuity and change.
In the case of an RMA, it is the discontinuous increase in military
capability and effectiveness that sets an RMA apart from the normal
evolutionary accretion of military capabilities, whether from technology
insertion or operational innovation. A revolution is not merely an
existential condition. Without recognition and exploitation, both
necessitating human action, there is no technological revolution.
Creating a revolution is more, therefore, than pushing the frontiers of
science or the boundaries of military systems; it must be a positivist
process that requires adaptation by the organism (or organization) for
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exploitation to occur. Thus, arguing that the introduction of new
technology itself creates an RMA seems to be a misreading of the
phenomenology of revolutions. Revolutions, moreover, possess a internal
dynamic different from evolutionary development. Revolutions are a
recognition that conditions have changed and represent a legitimation of
innovation and change, and a call to push at the boundaries. Separate
from the process of institutionalizing the revolution, the idea itself
of a revolution creates new conditions, including threats to existing
structures (and bureaucracies).
In addition to an agreed objective function that flows from
purpose, determination of a standard for assessing RMAs requires
criteria by which to make the measurement. Here an interesting
epistemological question arises that affects both purpose and
measurement: Is it sufficient to measure against the old norms, or does
dealing with a revolution itself require defining new norms in order to
capture the essence of the revolution?25 Evolutionary innovations, even
extremely clever ones, can be measured effectively with existing
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) since the paradigm or model has not
been altered. Evolutionary innovations, no matter how clever, merely
applique new methods and means while revolutionary innovations create
new paradigms. Truly innovative developments often do not only enhance
the ability to execute existing tasks, but also attempt to perform new
functions or meet new needs. Unless these new functions are captured in
the assessment, innovative developments often do not appear to offer
significant operational enhancements.26 As the context is altered by
revolutionary innovation, however, the old MOEs are clearly not
appropriate in measuring the new model of operations. Perhaps they are
no longer even relevant to altered objectives.
If the latter is true, then it follows that the entire analytical
construct must also be altered to correspond to the new paradigm,
affecting objective function, criteria, measures of effectiveness, as
well as modeling and simulation tools. Thus, the nature of the RMA is
not only a critical definitional problem, but an analytical one as well;
and, therefore, widespread interest in a new revolution in military
affairs strongly suggests the immediacy of the need for new analytical
tools.

The Process of Revolution. Successful military innovation is a
process that involves far more than just conceiving or developing new
technologies and operational concepts.27 Not only must the new
capabilities be physically developed and their superiority demonstrated,
but successful implementation of these innovations requires that they be
integrated into the military force structure and operational concepts.
Adoption of innovation demands more than just the ability to equip a
force or military service with innovative weapons. Organizations,
operational patterns, and decision processes must also be modified to
implement the innovation as an integral element of the service's ethos.
Considered as a process, a revolution consists of five steps.
First, the conditions must be right for a revolution to occur. For a
military technological revolution this probably implies not only the
existence of new technologies that could be exploited, but also altered
objective conditions in the geostrategic situation that make the world
ripe for change.28 An RMA involves a new appreciation of both "strategic
needs" and "strategic opportunities." The combination of these two
conditions presents the opportunity for new problems to be solved,
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whether or not they have previously even been recognized as problems,
what might be called "latent demand." For example, when IBM developed
the first personal computer (PC) in the early 1980s, no one forecast the
exponential explosion of personal computer use that has occurred--and
most importantly, no one understood or predicted the uses to which the
PC would be turned or the changes these would produce.29 But clearly, in
retrospect, there was a large unrecognized (i.e., latent) demand for the
capabilities that were then about to be made available. The second step
in the process, then, is the recognition of a revolution in the making.
The understanding that the appearance of new technical potentials and
objective conditions defines new boundaries allows new problems to be
identified that can only then be addressed.
The third step is acceptance or validation that a revolution is in
progress: that the problems which were formerly beyond the horizon are
now within our grasp and, therefore, worth addressing. The role of
decision makers here may be key. Their acceptance can serve to validate
the fact of the revolution, but their inattention can, on the other
hand, delay the acceptance and, therefore, slow exploitation of the
fruits of the revolution.30 It is only after this step that adoption and
adaptation can begin to occur; it is with this step that Kuhn's paradigm
shift begins. Again, drawing on the PC example, it is at this step that
the spreadsheet is invented and defines an entire range of problems that
can now be solved. It is not that the fundamental problems themselves
did not exist before; but because they were beyond the bounds of easy
solution, they existed outside the cognitive framework. Now with both
the tool and the need identified, these problems can be tackled by
anyone with a few thousand dollars, even if they didn't have the
technical skills or mathematical expertise previously required to model
complex financial situations. The fourth step involves the careful
specification of the new problem (or problems) that will be addressed
(even if not solved) and the initial understanding of the implications
that resolving these issues will have;31 it is this stage that starts
the institutionalization of the revolution. Finally, the fifth stage
involves the active exploitation of the revolution and the widespread
understanding of its consequences.
This view of the process of revolution suggests that these five
steps should be separated into two phases: first, a phase of "strategic
synthesis" that redefines the world and the problems that can be
addressed; and second, an exploitation phase, an "operational/tactical
synthesis" that defines how the problems will be addressed. This
exploitation phase is probably best carried out not as a sequential
series of activities (operational innovation, organizational adaptation,
and military systems evolution), but concurrently. It needs to integrate
these elements in order both to reduce the time cycle and to best obtain
synergy among the complex interrelationships of these elements--a
process similar to the "concurrent engineering" now in vogue in the
commercial sector. The strategic synthesis, however, must precede the
exploitation synthesis for the process to be properly tied to national
strategy--for it should be only at this point that the decision makers
can determine the strategic choices available and the overall directions
and priorities to be taken in order to address key strategic problems.
It is important to note that a strategic synthesis can occur even
in the absence of technical capabilities to drive or exploit it; and
this would appear to confirm the existence of two distinct, sequential
phases in the RMA process. Examples from previous Soviet practices would
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tend to reinforce this point. Changes to organizational structures in
response to changing perceptions of the strategic problem, such as the
creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), the Protivovozdushnaya
Oborona (PVO), and the Protivokosmicheskaya Oborona (PKO), each occurred
prior to Soviet capability to satisfy the technical requirements for
executing the missions assigned to these new organizations. However, the
organizational adaptation to the altered strategic perception (the
strategic synthesis) in each case led to the creation of a doctrinal
foundation which, in turn, led to the creation of system requirements,
i.e., the idea defined the technical demands.
A review of the elements of the inter-war aviation revolution also
illustrates the point. The technical capabilities for (or "core
competencies" in): improved aircraft engines, aluminum structures, and
monoplane designs did not tell decision makers whether to build pursuit
aircraft, strategic bombers, long-range escorts, or carrier-based
torpedo or dive bombers. "Core competencies" by themselves represent
what we can do; but without strategy and a campaign plan, we can't
determine whether they are what we should do.32 Moreover, even having
identified the specific instrument to be built, is it to be applied
within the present strategic context or used to overturn that context
and create a new strategic approach?33 This also suggests that any
attempt to identify "core competencies" for the U.S. military before the
strategic synthesis is completed is doomed to failure. Indeed, the
search for core competencies can only occur as part of the exploitation
phase since it is only with a strategy that one can determine whether
our capabilities are relevant.
The technical invention step may not be very different, whether a
particular military innovation is evolutionary or revolutionary.
However, the complete process for implementing innovation (and
especially the exploitation step) has striking differences in these two
cases, especially in those measures that are required for getting the
organization to adopt the innovation. Evolutionary innovations, which
offer improved means of accomplishing existing objectives, can be
appliqued onto the existing model of warfare,34 thereby minimizing
dislocation and disruption to the organization, as well as to its
sponsors and constituencies. This is, in fact, how the British and
French actually applied the superior armored capabilities they developed
during the inter-war period. In this case, since the calculus can
clearly demonstrate either increases in effectiveness or reductions in
cost for accomplishing the existing set of tasks, and the costs of
disruption are minor,35 the organization itself often becomes the
strongest proponent for adoption of the evolutionary innovation.
In the case, however, in which revolutionary innovations are
introduced, the situation becomes more complex and the path to adoption
more difficult exactly because of the procedural and organizational
implications of revolutionary innovations. Blitzkrieg represented this
type of challenge to successful implementation.36 Fundamentally,
Blitzkrieg did not introduce any new critical technologies; rather it
integrated armored forces, tactical aviation, and the radio into a new
matrix provided by innovative operational concepts and organizational
structures. With revolutionary innovation, fundamental change to the
existing paradigm is guaranteed; and, therefore, (unlike the case of a
Pareto optimum) while the overall benefits may be extremely large, there
will be entities within the organization, and sponsors and
constituencies external but linked to the organization, that will pay
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the price of these disruptions and dislocations. Thus, resistance to
profound change is likely to be increased the more profound and
discontinuous is the change. In particular, the potential effects of
RMAs on the conduct of warfare and operational concepts for future
campaigns suggest that attention also needs to be paid to how the
services may differentially use these innovations for organizational
advantage: not just for increased resources, but for a larger allocation
of future roles and missions.
The Character of This Revolution in Military Affairs.
While there appears to be general agreement in the community on
the character of previous RMAs, there seems to be substantially less
agreement either on the character of this RMA or on its role in future
U.S. strategy; these differences are critical to the choices decision
makers face.

The Roots of This RMA. Whatever the specific character of this RMA
now under consideration, it builds heavily on concepts first put forward
in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the series of papers by Marshal N.
V. Ogarkov, including his seminal 1982 paper.37 Ogarkov worried about
how to conduct decisive operations in the European Theater of War (TVD),
a theater that was exceptionally dense with heavily-armored mechanized
forces, and overwatched by theater nuclear forces on both sides.
Operational concepts such as the Independent Air Operation, the
Operational Maneuver Group (OMG), and the high intensity battalion
flowed directly from his strategic appreciation that tempo and striking
power were essential for solution of the problem.38 He and his
colleagues identified many of the critical operational/tactical elements
now being discussed for the new RMA; but perhaps most importantly, he
correctly understood that a revolution was in the making. In the Soviet
case, the idea for the RMA clearly preceded the technical capabilities
to implement and exploit the concept. This example reinforces the
important understanding that a revolution should start with the
strategic problem, not the technologies or military instruments--a
classically Marxist deterministic approach in which doctrine is derived
from the geopolitical conditions.
Ogarkov's real concern, however, was that, by the early 1980s, the
United States may have solved his strategic problem by synthesizing the
four constituent elements of an RMA that have been previously noted
(technologies, evolving military systems, operational innovation, and
organizational adaptation) into a whole that was more powerful than the
parts.39 In particular, he pointed to future U.S. technical capabilities
to exploit the revolution as well as the limitations on the Soviets' own
technical capabilities.40 In Ogarkov`s terms, the most impressive
capability demonstrated by the United States during the Gulf War was
probably the ability to conduct tightly synchronized, highly integrated
joint operations across the extent and throughout the depth of the
theater, striking both the enemy's strategic centers of gravity and the
enemy's operational forces, in order to produce decisive results41--the
very capability he had feared that the United States would be able to
turn against the Soviets in the European TVD.

Some Current Views of This RMA. A useful place to begin examining
current American views might start with what constitutes the most
prevalent perception of this new RMA. Many observers see this RMA
defined by the technologies demonstrated during the Gulf War: stealth,
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precision weapons, advanced sensors, C4I, and use of real-time (or
near-real-time) space systems. They believe that these technical
capabilities will allow the United States to dominate large-scale,
high-intensity conventional battlefields contested by opponents
possessing sizable armored and mechanized forces. In general, those who
hold this view of the RMA believe that this type of combat, baselined in
the Bottom-Up Review scenarios focused on Iran, Iraq, and North Korea,
will be the dominant challenge for the United States for the foreseeable
future. Those who take this technologically-driven approach also, in
general, view this RMA as ready for implementation, but with significant
life left to run from enhanced technology developments. Indeed, those
who hold this view also believe that with minor tweaking, the core
technologies can also address the other potential problems, such as
low-intensity conflict or special operations.
Other observers take a broader, more functionally-oriented view,
focused on generalized capabilities flowing from the "Information
Revolution": the integration of advanced sensors, C4I, brilliant
weapons, and simulation--i.e., the fusion of long-range fires and
information as the core of this RMA. Many view these new technical
capabilities as allowing the United States to move towards a
"cybernetic" approach or to implement the Reconnaissance-Strike Complex
(RSC) concept (first conceived by Ogarkov), or its newer incarnation,
the Reconnaissance-Strike-Defense Complex (RSDC).42 In their view, this
would allow the United States to destroy almost any target on the
battlefield instantly (as long as it yields a usable signature). Some
others have focused more on sensors and communications capabilities and
defined this RMA as "Information Dominance"; and the terms "Information
Warfare" or "Information-Based Warfare" are being widely used. All these
views take a bottom-up perspective, flowing from either the key
technology components or their integration into complex systems; and
they lead perhaps to too narrow an assessment of this RMA either as
merely bits and pieces or as only clever technology evolution. These
views, moreover, fail to capture the essence of revolutionary impacts,
and almost certainly mistate the historical lessons of RMAs in general,
and for this RMA in particular (discussed below).
Furthermore, these characterizations of the RMA are
input-oriented, rather than measuring outputs--they do not characterize
the RMA in terms of dramatically increased capabilities. This,
therefore, raises the question of how to distinguish an RMA from clever
military innovation: by the newness of its constituent elements or by
the discontinuous "revolutionary" leap in capabilities? And how are the
new capabilities produced by an RMA to be differentiated from simply
"good execution?" If, in fact, an RMA is identified by the ability to
solve a critical strategic problem through substantially increased
effectiveness from new operational capabilities, then it must follow
that a focus on the "piece parts" fails to capture the essence of the
revolution.

Towards An Output-Based Definition. DESERT STORM demonstrated that
a key advantage of U.S. forces was the ability to execute complex,
orchestrated, high-tempo, simultaneous, parallel operations that
overwhelmed the enemy's ability to respond. This advantage was built not
only on advanced sensors and smart weapons, but perhaps more importantly
on forces supported by modern C4I systems and technologies that allowed
the United States to collapse previous spatial and temporal constraints
on simultaneous operations, whether combined arms or joint. These new
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capabilities will represent a fundamental advantage for the United
States compared with any potential opponent and, therefore, should be a
central focus in future resource and planning decisions. DESERT STORM
may be but a foretaste of true coherent operations, but impressive
nonetheless in the demonstration of the power of coherence and
simultaneity.43 At the operational level, the impact of these coherent
operations is to overwhelm the opponent's ability to command and control
his forces, denying him the ability to respond to our campaign plan and
operations, and forcing him at the limit to execute only uncoordinated
preplanned actions. The number and tempo of these simultaneous parallel
operations by themselves produce saturation effects that simply overload
the enemy's command system and provide American forces with ample
exploitation opportunities.44
Therefore, at the operational level perhaps a good working
definition of this RMA would be as follows: a (massively) parallel
series of synchronized integrated operations conducted at high-tempo,
with high lethality and high mobility, throughout the depth and extent
of the theater, intended to force the rapid collapse of both the enemy's
military power and the enemy's will. The power of this RMA would allow
the United States the operational-level flexibility to allocate forces
and fires in real-time between holding, breakthrough, and exploitation
operations; and this allows concentration of effort to defeat enemy
forces in detail at our choosing. However, due to the simultaneous
parallel operations, the high mobility, the high lethality, and the
capability for sustained high tempos of operation, so many enemy units
can be defeated in detail simultaneously that the operation may resemble
a more classic coup de main executed in a single main-force
engagement.45
At the tactical level, the combination of high lethality and
real-time information produces a deadly increase in unit effectiveness
due to the short time constants of action by individual units (similar
to Colonel John Boyd's concept for air combat of acting inside the
enemy's observation/orientation/ decision/action cycle). While
"information dominance" is increasingly discussed, perhaps a deeper
understanding would focus on "cycle-time dominance" at the tactical
level and "command dominance" on the operational level. Altering the
time constants of decision and action to permit increased simultaneity
and enhanced coherence will require collapsing the traditional
distinctions between strategic, operational, and tactical as well as the
command pyramid.
The "Information Revolution" enables this RMA by facilitating the
shift to this type of seamless, high tempo parallel operational
doctrine; it is an enabler in the same way that the Agricultural and
Industrial Revolutions enabled the Napoleonic RMA. It provides two
critical capabilities: first, the ability to ascend a cognitive
hierarchy that starts with data, then provides information by
correlating data, then knowledge based on situational awareness, and
finally understanding built on the capability to predict and project
forward consequences-- and thereby improve decision making; and second,
the ability to communicate those decisions in real-time with a high
degree of assurance that the integrity of the message will be
maintained--thus enhancing the action part of the cycle.46 Coherent
operations, enabled by the new ability to ascend the cognitive
hierarchy, will allow, for the first time, turning C3I from a supporting
coordination function to a capability for real-time orchestration of
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combat power focused on the decisive point. It will provide the tools to
reinforce the traditional role of the commander in exercising command
during the battle.47 And moreover, the impact of this RMA may also alter
the advantages traditionally held by the initiator of conflict over the
responder, and thus the historic balance between the offense and
defense.

Implications for Utility. The very success of the Gulf War
(following six months of preparation allowed us by Iraq) may mask the
changing phenomenology of our evolving security problems, and,
therefore, the utility of this RMA in those circumstances: not massive,
theater-level combat between two large, well-equipped in-place forces,
but prompt response to regional contingencies in which we will not have
the benefit of a substantial forward force presence. Is the current goal
in exploiting this RMA, therefore, still overly burdened by a cold war
mindset formed by guarding the Inner-German Border (IGB) for 40 years or
is it truly consistent with the evolving strategic conditions?
The RMA, once correctly defined, can serve the decision makers in
a number of ways: as a filter for choosing new technology and
programmatic initiatives; as a new organizing principle for force
posture and roles and missions decisions; as a lever for bureaucratic
change and control; or even as a means for institutionalizing change
through a "process of permanent revolution." However, the maturity of
the RMA is an important consideration for decision makers attempting to
determine both how to use the RMA and how to implement it. What are the
different implications if this RMA is in its formative stages, and
therefore has considerable life yet to run, or if this is a mature
revolution, even if it is relevant to near-term problems? Understanding
this factor is critical for judging our competitive position and
assessing the ability of potential competitors to engage us with these
tools (or to assess their interest in doing so). If, as many observers
appear to agree, this is a revolution in its early stages, with much
headroom left for improvement in the individual constituent elements,
then a relevant question is the degree to which improvements at this
level would enhance the overall effectiveness of the RMA--how much edge
is necessary to maintain strategic dominance in intense mechanized
warfare?
An alternative view is that a DESERT STORM-type RMA is a
relatively mature revolution whose relevance and advantages may both be
receding. If we follow the logic of Marshall Ogarkov, this is a
revolution that has been proceeding for nearly 20 years, but has only
reached fruition now as the technical tools to implement it have become
available. Will adoption of a mature revolution lock us into a set of
old technologies with limited potential for further dramatic
improvements? (And moreover, it is a revolution aimed at a specific
context that may now be disappearing just as we are able to address it.)
A mature revolution would pose several potential implications: first,
that the asymmetric capabilities we now hold are likely to be transitory
since the sources of technical advantage may already be diffused and
beyond our control; second, that challengers are in a position to absorb
the operational innovations that the United States has made rather than
having to invent them afresh; third, some may also be able to mimic U.S.
organizational adaptations (which are open to inspection) if they can
overcome their own cultural and bureaucratic impediments;48 and fourth,
that future challengers may choose, rather than countermeasures to this
RMA (parallel development, direct counters, passive counters, or
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asymmetric counters), to alter their overall strategic concept and come
at us in ways that limit the relevance and utility of this RMA.49 Of
course, it may be that even if it is mature, it will remain relevant and
the United States will be able to maintain a substantial and useful
margin of advantage; but this issue requires analysis, not assertion.
Implications of This RMA.
The potent increases in operational effectiveness from this RMA
can only be obtained by adopting substantial changes in operational
concepts and organizational structures that will allow coherence to be
maintained across spatial and temporal dimensions, as well as among
forces of different types. Existing organizational structures, which are
themselves the product of adjusting to the gross imperfections of
previous C3I capabilities, reinforce the tight linkage between command
and control; and moreover, these structures are built around and
reinforce the classic distinctions between strategic, operational, and
tactical operations.50 The existing hierarchy of operational levels and
the corresponding levels of command will need to be reexamined,
rethought, and redefined as part of creating a new warfare paradigm.
Critical among these modifications will be changing the nature and
location of the decision-making processes that result from the exercise
of command and control of military forces in combat.
The existing warfare paradigm: (1) distinguishes among discrete
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation; (2) is based
heavily on preplanning; and (3) separates the overall operation into
discrete phases. Implementing coherent operations will require that
capabilities for command of simultaneous operations be increased and
that the current spatial and temporal distinctions among these types of
operations be removed. Moreover, shortening the critical time-constants
for decision and action will require decentralization of command
authority and a concomitant relaxation of control from the higher
levels. But these alterations to the existing distinctions between
strategic, operational, and tactical operations will require that the
traditional focus, functions, and roles of the commanders in the
existing hierarchical (and authoritarian) structure also be modified so
that the nature and character of the decisions and actions correspond to
the new paradigm.
Thus, it may be worthwhile to benefit from the experience already
in the commercial sector on the impacts of these types of changes. Many
of the critical enhancements portended by coherent operations are
already reflected in changes in the organizational structures and
decision and operations processes found in the commercial sector,
including changes in the role of management and the locus of decision
making in organizations. They are designed to improve dramatically the
speed of both decision and execution; the key elements in competitive
advantage. These changes affect the character of and requirements for
command and control at each level of the organizational hierarchy.
Military organizations, operational patterns, and decision processes
will have to be similarly modified in order for the U.S. military to
capture the potential for enhancing combat effectiveness offered by
coherent operations.
Relieved of the classic span-of-control constraints by new
technologies, organizational structures are being flattened and managers
are being refocused to improve rather than impede flows of critical
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information. Low-value-added activities are being discarded and new foci
for decisions at each level in the corporate hierarchy are being
developed. "Delayering" and flattening of existing hierarchies are
designed to move the locus of decision making closer to those who
execute the critical decisions in order to speed up the ability of the
institution to respond to unexpected conditions and opportunities. These
changes have been upsetting to commercial organizations and to the
people affected; and it has taken far longer than anticipated for the
benefits from infusing modern "information technologies" to show up in
the form of increased productivity and organizational effectiveness.
Recent research suggests that the transformation has been so lengthy
exactly because these organizations initially attempted to use the new
technology to increase efficiency in performing the old tasks, rather
than "re-engineering" the entire process based on the new capabilities.
Finally, perhaps the most fundamental change required to exploit
the new RMA is the alteration in perspective from improving the
individual elements of combat power (and measuring those enhancements)
to integrating and focusing the power of the "whole." Integration of the
whole rather than enhancement of the parts is the central pillar of this
RMA; then the campaign plan and joint operations become the defining
level for measuring effectiveness. Assessing the full impact of coherent
operations on a force projection military in future contingency
operations cannot be accomplished by retaining the present emphasis on
"stovepipe" operations, or "piece-parts" analyses, of forces executing
an old-fashioned campaign model first invented by General John J.
Pershing.
These changes suggest many of the restructuring activities that
will be required if the U.S. military is to seize the opportunities
presented by the RMA. Therefore, the services must be prepared to go
beyond the DESERT STORM model to investigate and to exercise new
operational as well as organizational concepts. These will include a
complete redesign of the traditional campaign paradigm, so that it can
define the direction and character of the RMA initiative and understand
the potential implications of an RMA that will fundamentally alter
doctrine and organizational concepts as well as future system
requirements.
In implementing the RMA and transforming the "conduct of warfare,"
perhaps the real innovation will be found at the level of the campaign
plan. The transformation will be in determining in which elements, in
what sequence mission tasks are combined, and in how rapidly they are
executed, rather than in the individual concepts for these mission tasks
(what the military calls tactics, techniques, and procedures). This type
of campaign needs to be viewed as an integrated, seamless process in
which time constants of the individual pieces are critical to the
effectiveness of the overall plan. Indeed, the analogy between this
campaign paradigm to "just-in-time production" or "agile manufacturing"
and the older campaign model, with its pre-planning, clearly delineated
phases, and reliance on reserves, to an inventory-based manufacturing
process is striking.51
Conclusions.
Despite the difficult definitional issues in characterizing this
RMA, the most important determinations that must be made concerning the
RMA initiative are not analytical (epistemology), but of purpose
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(teleology). Decision makers have three problems, all of which involve
crucial choices. First is the strategic purpose of the RMA, which
depends on the perception of the nature of the future strategic
environment. Second is its role in U.S. defense planning, which flows
from that prior determination of purpose. Third is to ask what is the
best way to exploit our particular implementation of this RMA?
First, while it appears that an RMA based on DESERT STORM would
fulfill Ogarkov's search for an operationally decisive instrument for
TVD-level planning and operations over the IGB contested by NATO and
Warsaw Pact forces, it is not apparent that this strategic problem
remains relevant. What is not answered is whether that RMA also would be
an appropriate and effective instrument for achieving strategic
objectives other than the military dominance of a theater of war, for
operations at levels below a theater of war, or for conflicts with
nonmechanized, non-Soviet-style opponents. A new strategic synthesis is
needed to translate the relevance of the RMA beyond our traditional cold
war problem. Consistency of means and ends is important. A revolution in
military effectiveness may succeed, and may even be dominant at the
tactical and operational levels, but may not produce strategically
decisive results unless it is exactly and appropriately related to
strategic purpose. While the German Blitzkrieg was an appropriate
operational solution to the problem of waging a rapid campaign in Europe
to avoid getting bogged down in a two-front war as in World War I, it
would not have been a relevant response to either the Japanese or U.S.
strategic problems in the Pacific theater. More importantly, Blitzkrieg
may well have been an appropriate operational concept in service of an
inappropriate strategy. The real German strategic problem, however, may
have been the prospect of a two-front war, an event they themselves
guaranteed by their attack on the Soviet Union. Completing the new
strategic synthesis is essential if the RMA is to be appropriately
linked to the strategic purposes relevant to the evolving geostrategic
environment.
Second, as an internal instrument, the RMA can serve many
different roles. Among them are: a screen for budgetary control, a
process for institutionalizing change, a tool for assuring that the
Department of Defense is structured to fight future wars, and a lever
for changes in roles and missions. However, these key roles depend less
on the specific internal details of the RMA (deciding between
technologies, systems, innovations, and organizational changes) than on
correctly capturing the Gestalt of this RMA.
In addition to the changing nature of the strategic problems that
the United States will face, design of U.S. forces must also address
operational and tactical level problems that will certainly change in
scale, if not in intensity and duration. While the advanced technologies
coupled to largely existing operational concepts and organizational
structures were used with great success in DESERT STORM, the Gulf War
displayed many idiosyncratic features; and it may well represent the
final act of the old strategic environment in which massed, armor-heavy
forces represented the critical component of the threat. Although DESERT
STORM focused on a major regional challenge, the fact that Iraqi forces
were equipped and largely trained along classic Soviet lines, as well as
the extended period in which the United States was able to put in place
an extensive infrastructure, stockpile huge amounts of logistics, and
deploy a diverse array of extremely large combat forces, made this
campaign perhaps resemble more traditional cold war contingencies than
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potential uncertain regional contingencies occurring on short notice
into largely unprepared theaters of operations.
If part of the overall effectiveness of this RMA depends on the
impact of overloading the enemy's command system, will these advantages
still pertain as the operational venue is reduced in scope and scale?52
Another facet of this issue is whether effective operations at lower
echelons employing the constituent tools of the RMA remain a military
technical revolution. Finally, a third facet is how much of the impact
of this RMA will be due to effective execution which is, in turn, highly
dependent on realistic training and exercises. This latter question is
exceptionally important for resource allocation decisions between force
size, quality, and readiness; and it is also important to our
understanding of how to preserve our present competitive advantage.
Finally, in light of the real costs of fundamental organizational
change needed to accommodate new operational concepts, the third
critical problem is to define an implementation concept that allows this
fundamental alteration to both the existing warfare as well as the
command and control paradigms; this course must maximize the likelihood
of the change being adopted and internalized by the military
institutionally, not simply grafted onto old stock. Perhaps more
importantly, coupled with the very real fiscal pressures, the success
itself of DESERT STORM may accelerate demands to reshape and restructure
the American military; and real questions arise whether the potential of
an RMA can be seized simply by appliquéing new technologies and systems
onto existing structures and concepts or can even be understood and
appreciated with the analytical tools developed for the previous
environment.
It may be that a dual focus and, therefore, a two phase RMA is
required, one that addresses both near-term and far-term strategic
problems. Accepting that an RMA is composed not only of technologies and
evolving military systems, but also of operational innovation and
organizational adaptation, it may be that the major focus for this RMA
in the near- to mid-term should lie in these two latter areas so that a
common base of technologies and military systems may be able to serve
the needs of both the high and low ends of the conflict spectrum-without draining already stressed budgets. And in light of three issues
identified in this monograph--relevance to future U.S. strategic
problems, the likely challenges to be presented by future opponents, and
maturity of this RMA--a case can be made that a major focus of an RMA
initiative should be not only to exploit fully the current technical
capabilities by creating an appropriate operational and organizational
matrix with the next RMA. To identify and allocate sufficient resources
to forging an RMA beyond that is more appropriate to the evolving set of
challenges only now dimly perceived on the strategic horizon.
Given the increasing globalization of technology sources, it is
probably self-evident that over the longer-term (but more debatable in
the near-term) the United States will lose the asymmetric advantages we
now hold in the underlying technologies needed for this RMA. Improved
intelligence collection and analysis in these areas (especially against
allies and potential suppliers of the critical technologies) should
yield significantly better understanding of these rates of change to
allow us to better gauge our relative competitive position. The
possibility that challengers may develop totally new operational
concepts is clearly speculative, but "gray design bureau" and "plan
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orange" type games may be extremely useful to explore the
possibilities.53 The degree to which challengers may absorb, or develop
on their own, the critical operational innovations and organizational
adaptations that are key to the RMA may be the most difficult questions
to resolve since they will require both an exceptionally good
understanding of the dynamics of an RMA (which is not yet in evidence)
and careful analysis of the complex relationships between an RMA and the
socio-cultural and economic factors of a wide range of potential
competitors. Recent history suggests that these questions will seriously
stress our intelligence and analytical communities.
How the operational and tactical levels of warfare are conducted
(disregarding politics for the moment) determines roles and missions,
the traditional focus of the military services; and an RMA would
undoubtedly bring about substantial changes in the current alignment of
roles and missions among the services. However, without the benefit of a
completed strategic synthesis, current attempts to redefine roles and
missions appear too early to have useful impact; these changes appear to
be elements that should occur only in the second phase of the
revolution--when the operational approach has been determined and the
path for exploitation has been clarified.
In summation, using an RMA initiative, intentionally or
unintentionally, primarily to define a "technical legacy" makes three
crucial errors. First, it misdirects effort toward a probably fruitless
search for "silver bullet" technology on which to build the RMA. Second,
it misdirects attention away from the critical issues of, and
relationships among: purpose, strategy, doctrine, operational
innovation, and organizational adaptation that are the essential issues
for an RMA. Third, in committing the first two errors, it compounds the
problem by being astrategic since it risks wasting very scarce defense
resources on new programs that may be irrelevant to future security
challenges. This course would be particularly unfortunate since it would
squander the rare opportunity presented by the changes in technological
conditions to enable an RMA that could appropriately forge America's
military for the evolving geostrategic environment; one that is also
being reshaped by fundamental changes in the underlying political,
economic, and socio-cultural conditions.
Notes:
1. When exploration of this subject by the American defense
community first began, the term commonly employed was the "Military
Technical Revolution" (MTR). Unfortunately, MTR denotes too great an
emphasis on technology. Therefore, much of the interested community now
uses the term Revolution in Military Affairs, which focuses on
revolution, and clearly places technology in a supporting role.
2. The U.S. defense community owes a debt of gratitude to Mr.
Andrew Marshall, the Director of Net Assessment, OSD, for identifying
this important subject and pressing efforts to have the community begin
an RMA initiative.
3. An external perspective focuses on outer-directed strategic
objectives while an internal perspective focuses on inner-directed
issues such as adapting the organization and overcoming structural
barriers to innovation.
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4. It may also be that one objective held by some analysts for the
RMA is not to address specific challenges from the diverse array of
potential competitors, but to attempt to use the RMA to maintain the
aura of unchallengeable, overall U.S. military and technical dominance
by shaping perceptions, by "casting long shadows," whether the RMA is an
appropriate solution to the specific challenges or not.
5. Does the nature of conflict result from natural laws (the
technical and environmental conditions that Karl Marx called the
"sub-structural forces") or from the interplay of sociopolitical and
economic factors (the evolving geostrategic interests)? Is the conduct
of warfare affected by the stage of social development of the
participants or can it be imposed by a key actor?
6. While Russia and other former Warsaw Pact nations may be
prepared to sell advanced weapons at prices that are very low by Western
standards, it is less likely that they will, or can, make those sales as
"loss leaders" for political or ideological influence.
7. For example, Hitler's "peaceful" annexation or "reunification"
of Austria, the Ansckluss, in 1938.
8. Carl Builder of RAND has written and discussed the latter
concept.
9. This issue, however, has a more complex, and darker side for
U.S. planning. While the Gulf War, and similar future conflicts, may
represent only limited threats to interests, and therefore limited
stakes, for the United States (or potential coalition partners), the
regional aggressor may perceive his "strategic interests" or even his
very survival (national or regime) at risk once the United States
engages with unconstrained military power, even in pursuit of "limited"
objectives. In light of the conventional military capabilities
demonstrated by the United States in that war, and especially the damage
inflicted by the "strategic" air campaign, we should not be surprised if
our opponents contemplate the use of their "strategic" weapons--whatever
they may be. Therefore, it is likely that we may be forced to employ
more limited means in achieving limited ends by the consequences of not
doing so.
10. It is an interesting question to explore this relationship
between vulnerability and stage of socioeconomic development; it may
well be that nations like Iraq are the most vulnerable, having grafted a
thin veneer of modernity onto fundamentally less-developed societies,
and thereby creating an exceptionally fragile infrastructure that does
not respond well to stress.
11. And despite the relative optimism expressed earlier, a major
threat could emerge sooner. After all, it was only 10 years between the
height of the Weimar Republic and the invasion of the Soviet Union in
1941. See Jeffrey R. Cooper, Implications of a "Long Peace," Center for
National Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, December
1991, for a discussion of other historical analogues for the period we
have now entered.
12. This same problem bedevils the concept of "prototyping." While
there is certainly utility in proving a new technology or piece of
equipment, there is probably little sense in putting it "on the shelf"
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to await a future conflict since it is likely to be obsolescent at that
time. Thus, in this context, both prototyping and the MTR are better
viewed as processes, not products--explicitly designed to maintain
ferment in their particular areas.
13. As Dr. Daniel Gouré, Deputy Director for Politico-Military
Affairs, CSIS, has aptly phrased it, "Nintendo Warfare."
14. This concept is not new. In fact, some had explored this
notion in earlier years by suggesting that Pershings be deployed in
German town squares in order to force the ugly choice of large-scale
civilian deaths in a Soviet preemptive attack.
15. The "CNN effect" refers to the global, real-time news coverage
that is becoming increasingly available and makes conduct of most
military operations a matter of immediate public scrutiny.
16. For the purposes of this monograph, the term nature of war
will be defined by the entities that engage in the conflict and the
objectives over which they fight while conduct of warfare will refer to
the modalities of the conflict, that is, how the war is fought. Thus,
during the past century and a half, the nature of war has been defined
by the fact that it has been fought by nation-states for political
objectives; warfare has been conducted primarily by mass armies equipped
with weapons provided by modern industrial technology. I do recognize
that others use nature of war to refer to the immutable characteristics
such as combat, leadership, valor, and blood.
17. I am indebted to COL Gary Griffin, USA, TRADOC, for this
important insight. Dr. John Hanley has also touched upon this point in
"Implications of the Changing Nature of Conflict for the Submarine
Force," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1993.
18. The Soviet stress on the political dimension of war and the
correspondence of military power with the "stages of socio-cultural
development" recognized that strategy exists within a complex web of
nontechnical factors.
19. See for example, J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War: 1789-1961,
1961 (republication by the Da Capo Press, New York, 1992), pp. 15-25,
for an excellent discussion of these changes.
20. See Fuller; the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ended the Thirty
Years War which was a religious conflict of absolute ends and total
means, and opened a period of limited conflict objectives. Prior to
raison d etat of the modern civil state, war in Europe was often fought
for absolutist (if not Manichean) religious reasons resembling
ideological conflict.
21. See Robert E. Osgood, Limited War, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1957. As Fuller, p. 20, noted, this actually harkened
back to pre-Napoleonic objectives of the "absolute" monarchs.
22. See, for example, Robert W. Tucker, "A Just War?," National
Interest, Fall 1991. Indeed, domestic reaction fueled by the "CNN
effect" to scenes of destruction on the "Highway of Death" was clearly
one factor in curtailing coalition combat operations and probably can't
be ignored in the future. The new Army FM 100-5 explicitly notes this
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factor in planning and conducting future operations.
23. See Dr. Andrew Krepinevich's original 1992 study on the MTR
prepared while he was in OSD/NA.
24. This would be consistent with the literature on technology
innovation, transfer, and adoption by firms and industries. Directed,
dedicated research, while the most costly, tends to be the easiest and
quickest to apply. "Not invented here" developments often find internal
sponsorship and adaptation difficult, even once their relevance and
implications are recognized.
25. For example, if an RMA involves a
attrition paradigm to one in which speed of
then it should follow that the dimension of
well from questions of "how many killed" to

fundamental shift from an
execution is as important,
measurement should shift as
"how quickly."

26. GPS is an extremely recent and relevant example of the
problem. An older example was the Army's attempt until the 1930s to
treat the machine gun as an artillery weapon.
27. There is an extensive literature on both military and civilian
innovation that explores the phenomenology of the entire process,
including the complex problems attendant on organizational adoption of
the innovation, not just the step of technical invention.
28. The phenomenology of this cognitive dissonance is the same
whether it is in the context of Kuhn's "paradigm shift" or the
Marxist-Leninist formulation of "internal contradictions."
29. A classic problem in the literature on invention and
innovation is the inability to predict the impact a new development may
have not in meeting existing needs but in creating entirely new markets.
Not only IBM and the "PC" in the early 1980s, but IBM and the mainframe
computer in the 1950s, and the Air Force and GPS in the 1970s, are all
good examples of unpredictable "latent demands" that could not be
forecast in the existing framework. Without understanding of the type
and magnitude of the change the invention would introduce, analysis in
the existing context was irrelevant.
30. What is not clear, however, is whether their opposition can
stop a revolution; historical analysis could answer this important
question.
31. Given the peculiarly American approach to analysis
(decomposition, assessment in detail, only then synthesis, and finally
understanding of the whole), the process attendant on revolutionary
innovation poses a difficult procedural reversal demanding a "holistic"
or Gestalt approach ab initio.
32. The concept of "core competencies," developed at the Harvard
Business School, is currently in use by organizational consultants
attempting to reform or restructure private-sector companies; it
attempts to identify those particular areas in which an organization is
exceptionally proficient as the focus for its energies.
33. As Dr. Gouré has pointed out, the British invented the tank
and employed it piecemeal in the Battle of Cambrai, within that existing
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strategic context, to support the breakthrough of infantry against
machine guns and fortified trench systems. The Germans, on the other
hand, organized the tank into armored formations and integrated them
with close air support to develop the Blitzkrieg, which created a new
strategic context. This problem may affect the existing seven DDR&E
"thrust areas"; without a stronger link to strategy appropriate to the
new security context, pursuit of these areas will not necessarily
provide important tools for strategic exploitation.
34. This paradigm or model includes division of roles and missions
among the services, as well as campaign plans at the joint level, and
force structure and doctrine within each service.
35. Thereby creating a Pareto optimum in which no party is made
worse.
36. And adoption of Blitzkneg was strongly resisted by the German
Army hierarchy.
37. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the
Homeland, March 25, 1982, is the key paper usually cited. Other shorter
papers by Ogarkov date back to fall 1979; and a later important work was
his 1984 May Day article.
38. "Battalions in Military Operations," Military Herald, 1985,
for example, is a conceptual precursor to the high leverage brigade
concept now being discussed by USCENTCOM.
39. See, for example, the 1982 FM 100-5, Airland Battle, and the
Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA) concept, both based on the innovative
ideas of Generals DePugh, Starry, and others; these could certainly have
fueled Ogarkov's concern. These doctrinal changes indicate that the
United States also had an intuitive understanding of the revolution that
was about to occur; but like Moliere's character, the Army had been
speaking prose (the RMA) but didn't know it.
40. Ogarkov, History Teaches Vigilance, April 1985. This
appreciation, in turn, led to the support by much of the Soviet military
for perestroika in order to create the internal preconditions for
competing with the United States in this new technical era. Having
watched the United States validate the RMA, many in the former Soviet
military are likely to be convinced that the correctness of pursuing the
path of "denuclearization" by political means and perestroika internally
has been confirmed. Marshal Grachev, Yeltsin's Defense Minister, for
example, has been an outspoken proponent of both elements.
41. For example, this was highlighted in the Desert Storm "Lessons
Learned" Study conducted by the Center for National Security Studies,
Los Alamos National Laboratory.
42. All these concepts owe much to Soviet work in "control theory"
and automated processes.
43. See Jeffrey A. Cooper, The Coherent Battlefield, SRS White
Paper, Arlington, VA, June 1993, for a more complete discussion of
Coherent Operations.
44. These effects, in fact, resemble the conditions intended to be
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produced by Soviet-style "Radio Electronic Combat."
45. Another benefit of the intense but rapid execution is the
likely reduction in American casualties compared with a more drawn out,
sequential attrition style operation.
46. Many commentators have returned to John Boyd's concept of the
Observation/Orientation/Decision/Action (OODA) Loop in discussing the
impact of the "Information Revolution." Almost uniformly, however, they
have focused on the decision side of the cycle (observation/orientation/
decision) and neglected the very important implications of significantly
enhanced "information technology" for the action element. Real-time,
dependable communications have analogous effects to Boyd's key technical
requirement for the pilot/aircraft combination, 3000 psi hydraulics, to
link more rapid decisions by the commander to responsive actions by his
unit.
47. The new C4I technologies could also be used to create a new
class of remote commanders, not unlike the British and French "Chateau
Generals" in World War I, displaced physically but linked to the front
by the telegraph. The wide band width and real-time processing
capabilities may well tempt the military to this Faustian bargain.
48. An intriguing and important sociological issue is the
relationship of an RMA to the society which fosters it--must it be
organic to and consistent with the socio-cultural foundation--or can it
be grafted onto alien stock?
49. As noted earlier, an opposing proposition suggests that much
of the U.S. advantage lies beyond the four constituent elements in the
ability to execute, which is built on training, exercises, simulation,
and supporting elements such as logistics and maintenance--these factors
may be even more difficult to replicate and have traditionally been
neglected by most militaries outside the developed world.
50. See, for example, Colonel James G. Burton, "Pushing Them Out
the Back Door," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1993, and
subsequent correspondence for views on the confusion in roles and
command levels engendered by these changes in our understanding of the
command functions at the strategic and operational levels of war. My own
view is that the operational level is expanding as the capabilities to
engage in Clausewitzian decisive combat are being recovered. As time
replaces space as the critical factor, the concurrency and compression
of future campaigns may provide opportunities for "tactical" engagements
to become decisive.
51. Once this analogy is drawn, it is interesting to contemplate
the disastrous experience of General Motors in automating and robotizing
key production lines ("innovative operational concepts") rather than in
"re-engineering" the entire production process itself and better
integrating existing manual subprocesses.
52. A useful study would be to analyze the relationships between
combat tempo, scope, and parallelism on the one hand, and the number and
pace of command decisions on the other; while this smacks of previous
Soviet interest in command norms and cybernetic control theory, they may
well have intuitively understood this element as an important component
of the emerging RMA.
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53. It should be noted that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
was not an example of technological surprise, but of both operational
and tactical surprise. The tactical surprise was that they could
effectively deliver air-dropped torpedoes in shallow, contained waters.

31

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General William A. Stofft
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Colonel John W. Mountcastle
Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Author
Mr. Jeffrey R. Cooper
Editor
Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling
Secretary
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Conference Cover Artist
Mr. Lawrence C. Miller
Composition
Mr. Daniel B. Barnett
Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler

32

